Kelo v. City of New London

Issue

The issue before the court in Kelo v. City of New London is whether the Fifth Amendment allow exercise of eminent domain for the public purpose of economic development.

Rule

The most recent, relevant cases are: Berman v. Parker, 348 U. S. 26 (1954), Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U. S. 229 (1984), and Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981).

Analysis

Previous cases before this court have decided that: 1) "public purpose" falls with the meaning of "public use" under the Fifth Amendment; 2) the state may delegate its eminent domain power; 3) the power may be delegated to private, nonprofit corporation; 4) "public purpose" includes development that does not result in direct benefit to the local community (railroad right-of-way without a local depot); and 5) "public use" includes private owned and operated installations, such as rail yards, terminals, and ports. Therefore, the use of eminent domain for the direct transfer of property from private owner to private owner by a state empowered, private, nonprofit corporation is not an issue before this court.

Berman decided that public purpose includes the elimination of blighted neighborhoods that have become “injurious to the public health, safety, morals, and welfare” and that to “eliminat[e] all such injurious conditions by employing all means necessary and appropriate for the purpose,” included eminent domain. Id., at 28. A sufficient blight in a neighborhood allowed the condemnation of the entire neighborhood, including the non-blighted properties, to wit: Berman's department store.

Midkiff decided that public purpose includes the elimination of economic disfunction, the land oligopoly on the island of Oahu. On Oahu, 92% of private land was held by 72 private landowners and 72.5% was held by 22 private landowners via fee simple title. Id., at 232. The public harm due to “skewing the State’s residential fee simple market, inflating land prices, and injuring the public tranquility and welfare,” was sufficient to warrant condemnation and redistribution of title. Ibid.

Poletown decided that condemmnation of private property for economic development is in accordance the Fifth Amendment. In Poletown, all of the properties were consolidated into a single property for a dedicated, specific unitary use: a General Motors assembly plant. Both Berman and Midkiff utilized eminent domain to address a public harm. Condemnation of property, transfer of title, and subsequent action by the new owners directly addressed and alleviated the public harm.

In the instant case, the respondants state that New London was designated "an economically distressed city" in 1990. In the intervening years, economic conditions in New London have worsened. The Naval Undersea Warfare Center has relocated. The city's unemployment rate is double that of the state. The city's population has fallen to the lowest level since 1920. The respondant claims that their future action will directly address and mitigate the city's current economic plight.

Respondant does not claim land parcels in question are blighted or that that there is a situation “injurious to the public health, safety, morals, and welfare.” The respondant's claim is that the proposed course of action will result in an economic benefit to the residents of the City of New London, not the elimination of a public harm.

Poletown created a single, contiguous tract of land; a requirement for construction of the facility. In the instant case, the parcels are designated for a variety of uses. None are to be used by Pfizer for its facility.

Conclusion

Eminent domain under the Fifth Amendment may be used for two public purposes: 1) to address a public harm; 2) to create single parcel of land so that a dedicated unitary facilty can be built. The injurious condition may the traditional one of neighborhood blight or it may be market disfunction via land ownership oligopoly. The Fifth Amendment does not encompass the condemnation of private property in order to re-purpose the property for economic development, unless all the condemned properties are incorporated into a dedicated unitary parcel required for the planned facility.

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.