Notable Items:

Title VII Discrimination Test:
In other words, a but-for test directs us to change one thing at a time and see if the outcome changes. If it does, we have found a but-for cause.

The following are immaterial:

Rule of Statutory Interpretation:
Nor is there any such thing as a “canon of donut holes,” in which Congress’s failure to speak directly to a specific case that falls within a more general statutory rule creates a tacit exception. Instead, when Congress chooses not to include any exceptions to a broad rule, courts apply the broad rule.

First Amendment Issues:
Separately, the employers fear that complying with Title VII’s requirement in cases like ours may require some employers to violate their religious convictions.
But how these doctrines protecting religious liberty interact with Title VII are questions for future cases too.

Two of the three cases concern conduct...firings for conduct that would have been ignored if done by a woman.

"but-for" occurs twenty-three times in Gorsuch and does not appear in either Alito or Kavanaugh.

Roberts may have joined solely to determine that Gorsuch would write the opinion in place of Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, or Kagan. Furthermore, a poorly-crafted opinion would be easier to disregard as precedent or to overturn in the future.

Petitioner: Gerald Lynn Bostock
Respondent: Clayton County, Georgia
Venue: Supreme Court of the United States
Opinion of the Court: Bostock v. Clayton County (2020)

Issue(s) Before the Court:

... whether an employer can fire someone simply for being homosexual or transgender.
The only question before us is whether an employer who fires someone simply for being homosexual or transgender has discharged or otherwise discriminated against that individual “because of such individual’s sex.”

Petitioner's Claim(s):

Each employee sued, alleging sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Respondent's Claim(s):

... contend that even intentional discrimination against employees based on their homosexual or transgender status is not a basis for Title VII liability.
... that homosexuality and transgender status are distinct concepts from sex, and that if Congress wanted to address these matters in Title VII, it would have referenced them specifically.
... that few in 1964 would have expected Title VII [of the Civil Rights Act of 1964] to apply to discrimination against homosexual and transgender persons. But legislative history has no bearing here, where no ambiguity exists about how Title VII’s terms apply to the facts. See Milner v. Department of Navy, 562 U. S. 562, 574.

Holding(s) and Disposition:

Held: An employer who fires an individual merely for being gay or transgender violates Title VII.
A statutory violation occurs if an employer intentionally relies in part on an individual employee’s sex when deciding to discharge the employee.
It makes no difference if other factors besides the plaintiff’s sex contributed to the decision or that the employer treated women as a group the same when compared to men as a group.
... Title VII’s legal analysis, which asks simply whether sex is a but-for cause.
Second and Sixth Circuits affirmed.
Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded

Material Facts:

Procedural History:

Gorsuch Rationale (Roberts, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan)

Majority Opinion (33 pages)

Alito Dissent (Thomas) (54 pages not including appendicies)

Kavanaugh Dissent (none) (28 pages not including appendicies)

Majority Full Argument