Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire

Notable Items:

Facts:

• Chaplinsky was distributing the literature of his sect on the streets
• Members of the local citizenry complained to the City Marshal, Bowering, that Chaplinsky was denouncing all religion as a "racket."
• [City Marshal] warned Chaplinsky that the crowd was getting restless
• a disturbance occurred and the traffic officer on duty at the busy intersection started with Chaplinsky for the police station
• did not inform him that he was under arrest or that he was going to be arrested
• [City Marshal] repeated his earlier warning to Chaplinsky,
• [Petitioner] with force and arms, ... on the public sidewalk ... did unlawfully repeat the words ... the same being offensive, derisive and annoying words and names.
• Chaplinsky's version:
• [upon encountering the City Marshal, petitioner] asked him to arrest the ones responsible for the disturbance
• [City Marshal] ursed him and told him to come along
• [Petitioner] with force and arms, ... on the public sidewalk ... did unlawfully repeat the words ... the same being offensive, derisive and annoying words and names.
• There is no substantial dispute over the facts.

Procedural History:

• Over appellant's objection, the trial court excluded, as immaterial, testimony relating to appellant's mission "to preach the true facts of the Bible," his treatment at the hands of the crowd, and the alleged neglect of duty on the part of the police.
• [Petitioner] was convicted in municipal court of Rochester, New Hampshire, for violation of Chapter 378, § 2 , of the Public Laws of New Hampshire: "No person shall address any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other person who is lawfully in any street or other public place, nor call him by any offensive or derisive name, nor make any noise or exclamation in his presence and hearing with intent to deride, offend or annoy him, or to prevent him from pursuing his lawful business or occupation."
• Upon appeal, there was a trial de novo of appellant before a jury in the Superior Court.
• He was found guilty,
• judgment of conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State. 91 N.H. 310, 18 A.2d 754.
• [exclustion] approved by the court below, which held that neither provocation nor the truth of the utterance would constitute a defense to the charge.

Petitioner's Claim(s):

Issues:

Holding(s) and Disposition:

1. 91 N.H. 310, 18 A.2d 754, affirmed.
3. that part of c. 378, § 2, of the Public Law of New Hampshire is sufficiently definite and specific to comply with requirements of due process of law. P. 315 U. S. 573.
   
4. that the statute does not substantially or unreasonably impinge upon freedom of speech. P. 315 U.S. 574.
5. refusal of the state court to admit evidence offered by the defendant tending to prove provocation and evidence bearing on the truth or falsity of the utterances charged is open to no constitutional objection. P. 315 U.S. 574.

Rationale:

Murphy majority opinion

• [Fighting words are not protected speech]
• [Statue is not VoidForVagueness ]
• [Detailed Reasoning]
• only an attack on the basis of free speech is warranted.
• The spoken, not the written, word is involved.
• cannot conceive that cursing a public officer is the exercise of religion in any sense of the term
• would not cloak him with immunity from the legal consequences for concomitant acts committed in violation of a valid criminal statute.
• We turn, therefore, to an examination of the statute itself.
• There are certain well defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.
• These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words -- those which, by their very utterance, inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.
• [the statute] has two provisions -- the first relates to words or names addressed to another in a public place; the second refers to noises and exclamations.
• We accept that construction of severability and limit our consideration to the first provision of the statute. [text below]
• We are unable to say that the limited scope of the statute as thus construed contravenes the Constitutional right of free expression.
• narrowly drawn and limited to define and punish specific conduct lying within the domain of state power, the use in a public place of words likely to cause a breach of the peace.
• disposes of appellant's contention that the statute is so vague and indefinite as to render a conviction thereunder a violation of due process
• Nor can we say that the application of the statute to the facts disclosed by the record substantially or unreasonably impinges upon the privilege of free speech.
• The refusal of the state court to admit evidence of provocation and evidence bearing on the truth or falsity of the utterances is open to no Constitutional objection.

?? concur in part, dissent in part (??)

• [Detailed Reasoning]

?? dissent (??)

• [Detailed Reasoning]

Relevant Portion of New Hampshire Statute