Craig v. Boren

Notable Items:

Issue(s) Before the Court:

Petitioner's Claim(s):

Respondent's Claim(s):

Holding(s) and Disposition:

• Whitener in any event independently has established third-party standing. She suffers "injury in fact," since the challenged statutory provisions are addressed to vendors like her, who either must obey the statutory provisions and incur economic injury or disobey the statute and suffer sanctions. In such circumstances, vendors may resist efforts to restrict their operations by advocating the rights of third parties seeking access to their market.
• Oklahoma's gender-based differential constitutes an invidious discrimination against males 18-20 years of age in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.

Material Facts:

• Appellant Craig, a male then between 18 and 21 years old, and appellant Whitener, a licensed vendor of 3.2% beer
• action for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that an Oklahoma statutory scheme prohibiting the sale of "nonintoxicating" 3.2% beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18 constituted a gender-based discrimination that denied to males 18-20 years of age the equal protection of the laws.
• A full recounting of the facts is available below

Procedural History:

• This action was brought in the District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma on December 20, 1972, by appellant Craig, a male then between 18 and 21 years of age, and by appellant Whitener, a licensed vendor of 3.2% beer.
• The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of the gender-based differential on the ground that it constituted invidious discrimination against males 18-20 years of age.
• A three-judge court convened under 28 U.S.C. § 2281 sustained the constitutionality of the statutory differential and dismissed the action. 399 F. Supp. 1304 (1975).
• We noted probable jurisdiction of appellants' appeal, 423 U.S. 1047 (1976)

Rationale

Brennan Majority Opinion (White, Marshall, Powell, Stevens, Blackmun)

• Analysis may appropriately begin with the reminder that Reed [v. Reed] emphasized that statutory classifications that distinguish between males and females are "subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause."
• To withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives. level of scrutiny
• But this merely illustrates that proving broad sociological propositions by statistics is a dubious business, and one that inevitably is in tension with the normative philosophy that underlies the Equal Protection Clause. [what basis for 'broad sociological propositions' then?]
• In sum, the principles embodied in the Equal Protection. Clause are not to be rendered inapplicable by statistically measured but loose-fitting generalities concerning the drinking tendencies of aggregate groups.
• A full description of the rationale is available below

Powell Concurrance (none)

Stevens Concurrance (none)

Blackmun Concurrance (none)

Stewart Concurrance (none)

Burger Dissent (none)

• At the outset, I cannot agree that appellant Whitener has standing arising from her status as a saloonkeeper to assert the constitutional rights of her customers.
• In this Court, "a litigant may only assert his own constitutional rights or immunities." United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17, 362 U. S. 22 (1960).
• In sum, permitting a vendor to assert the constitutional rights of vendees whenever those rights are arguably infringed introduces a new concept of constitutional standing to which I cannot subscribe.
• On the merits, we have only recently recognized that our duty is not "to create substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws." San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 411 U. S. 33 (1973).
• Thus, even interests of such importance in our society as public education and housing do not qualify as "fundamental rights" for equal protection purposes, because they have no textually independent constitutional status. See id. at 411 U. S. 29-39 (education); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S. 56 (1972) (housing).
• Though today's decision does not go so far as to make gender-based classifications "suspect," it makes gender a disfavored classification.
• Without an independent constitutional basis supporting the right asserted or disfavoring the classification adopted, I can justify no substantive constitutional protection other than the normal McGowan v. Maryland, supra at 366 U. S. 425-426, protection afforded by the Equal Protection Clause.

Rehnquist Dissent (none)

• The Court's disposition of this case is objectionable on two grounds.
• First is its conclusion that men challenging a gender-based statute which treats them less favorably than women may invoke a more stringent standard of judicial review than pertains to most other types of classifications. Second is the Court's enunciation of this standard, without citation to any source, as being that "classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives, and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives." Ante at 429 U. S. 197 (emphasis added).
• The only redeeming feature of the Court's opinion, to my mind, is that it apparently signals a retreat by those who joined the plurality opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677 (1973), from their view that sex is a "suspect" classification for purposes of equal protection analysis.
• I think the Oklahoma statute challenged here need pass only the "rational basis" equal protection analysis expounded in cases such as McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420 (1961), and Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483 (1955), and I believe that it is constitutional under that analysis.
• Part I
• The Court's conclusion that a law which treats males less favorably than females "must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives" apparently comes out of thin air.
• The Equal Protection Clause contains no such language, and none of our previous cases adopt that standard.
• Part II
• The applicable rational basis test is one which "permits the States a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens differently than others.
• A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. at 366 U. S. 425-426 (citations omitted).
• The personal interest harmed here is very minor -- the present legislation implicates only the right to purchase 3.2% beer, certainly a far cry from the important personal interests which have on occasion supported this Court's invalidation of statutes on similar reasoning. Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632, 414 U. S. 640 (1974); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 405 U. S. 651 (1972).
• And the state interest involved is significant -- the prevention of injury and death on the highways.
• There being no violation of either equal protection or due process, the statute should accordingly be upheld.

Full Recounting of Facts

• A list of the material facts is available above

Majority Full Argument

• Part I -- Standing
• Appellant Craig attained the age of 21 after we noted probable jurisdiction.
• Therefore, since only declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of the gender-based differential is sought, the controversy has been rendered moot as to Craig.
• The question thus arises whether appellant Whitener, the licensed vendor of 3.2% beer, who has a live controversy against enforcement of the statute, may rely upon the equal protection objections of males 18-20 years of age to establish her claim of unconstitutionality of the age-sex differential.
• ... we conclude that appellant Whitener has established independently her claim to assert jus tertii standing.
• As a vendor with standing to challenge the lawfulness of §§ 241 and 245, appellant Whitener is entitled to assert those concomitant rights of third parties that would be "diluted or adversely affected" should her constitutional challenge fail and the statutes remain in force. Griswold v. Connecticut
• Part II A -- Scrutiny
• Analysis may appropriately begin with the reminder that Reed [v. Reed] emphasized that statutory classifications that distinguish between males and females are "subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause."
• To withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives. level of scrutiny
• Reed v. Reed has also provided the underpinning for decisions that have invalidated statutes employing gender as an inaccurate proxy for other, more germane bases of classification.
• In light of the weak congruence between gender and the characteristic or trait that gender purported to represent, it was necessary that the legislatures choose either to realign their substantive laws in a gender-neutral fashion or to adopt procedures for identifying those instances where the sex-centered generalization actually comported with fact.
• Part II B -- District Court Conclusions
• The District Court ... concluded that the statistics introduced by the appellees established that the gender-based distinction was substantially related to achievement of that [traffic safety] goal.
• Part II C -- Analysis
• However, appellees' statistics, in our view, cannot support the conclusion that the gender-based distinction closely serves to achieve that objective, and therefore the distinction cannot, under Reed, withstand equal protection challenge.
• Viewed in terms of the correlation between sex and the actual activity that Oklahoma seeks to regulate -- driving while under the influence of alcohol -- the statistics broadly establish that .18% of females and 2% of males in that age group were arrested for that offense.
• While such a disparity is not trivial in a statistical sense, it hardly can form the basis for employment of a gender line as a classifying device.
• Indeed, prior cases have consistently rejected the use of sex as a decisionmaking factor even though the statutes in question certainly rested on far more predictive empirical relationships than this.
• But this merely illustrates that proving broad sociological propositions by statistics is a dubious business, and one that inevitably is in tension with the normative philosophy that underlies the Equal Protection Clause. [what basis for 'broad sociological propositions' then?]
• In fact, when it is further recognized that Oklahoma's statute prohibits only the selling of 3.2% beer to young males, and not their drinking the beverage once acquired (even after purchase by their 18-20-year-old female companions), the relationship between gender and traffic safety becomes far too tenuous to satisfy Reed's requirement that the gender-based difference be substantially related to achievement of the statutory objective.
• We hold, therefore, that under Reed, Oklahoma's 3.2% beer statute invidiously discriminates against males 18-20 years of age.
• Part II D
• Our view is, and we hold, that the Twenty-first Amendment does not save the invidious gender-based discrimination from invalidation as a denial of equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
• The wording of § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment [Footnote 20] closely follows the Webb-Kenyon and Wilson Acts, ex.pressing the framers' clear intention of constitutionalizing the Commerce Clause framework established under those statutes.
• This Court's decisions since have confirmed that the Amendment primarily created an exception to the normal operation of the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U. S. 324, 377 U. S. 330 (1964); Carter v. Virginia, 321 U. S. 131, 321 U. S. 139-140 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U. S. 395, 305 U. S. 398 (1939).
• In fact, social science studies that have uncovered quantifiable differences in drinking tendencies dividing along both racial and ethnic lines strongly suggest the need for application of the Equal Protection Clause in preventing discriminatory treatment that almost certainly would be perceived as invidious. [Footnote 22] [Facts be damned]
• In sum, the principles embodied in the Equal Protection. Clause are not to be rendered inapplicable by statistically measured but loose-fitting generalities concerning the drinking tendencies of aggregate groups.
• The core of the rationale is available above