Fischer v. United States

Statue:

Notable Items:

Issue(s) Before the Court:

Plaintiff / Appellant / Petitioner's Claim(s):

Defendant / Appellee / Respondent's Claim(s):

Holding(s) and Disposition:

Material Facts:

• A full recounting of the facts is available below

Procedural History:

Rationale

Majority Opinion (xxx)

• A full description of the rationale is available below

Jackson Concurrance

• ... the question before this Court is ... : What is the scope of the partic- ular crime Congress has outlined in 18 U. S. C. §1512(c)(2)?
• ... this Court’s task is to determine what conduct is proscribed by the criminal statute that has been invoked as the basis for the obstruction charge at issue here.
• I join in the Court’s opinion because I agree with the majority that §1512(c)(2) does not reach “ ‘all forms of obstructive conduct’ ” and is, instead, “limited by the preceding list of criminal violations” in §1512(c)(1).
• I write separately to explain why and how that interpretation of §1512(c) follows from the legislative purpose that this statute’s text embodies. [emphasis added]
• I Interpretation of the Text
• Our goal in interpreting any statute should be “to give effect to the intent of Congress.” United States v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U. S. 534, 542 (1940).
• There is no question that intent is generally expressed through the text of a statute. See American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U. S. 63, 68 (1982).
• Here, the majority rightly interprets the scope of §1512(c)(2) by “look[ing] for guidance from” the statutory “examples [that] come before” it—those listed in §1512(c)(1). In my view, the examples that Congress opts to include in the text of a statute evince its intentions concerning what the rule covers and thereby help express a particular legislative purpose.
• [discussion of Roberts' football rule. See Barrett II A 1 for refutation.]
• II Legislative Intent
• Subsection (c)(1) is indisputably focused on persons who engage in a particular kind of obstructive conduct: Anyone who “corruptly ... alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object, ... with the intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding.”
• Subsection (c)(2), in turn, is directed at criminal conduct that “otherwise” achieves a similar result.
• I therefore agree with the majority that §1512(c)(2)’s reach is narrower than the Government contends.
• According to the Senate Report, §1512(c) was drafted to fill these gaps: “When a person destroys evidence with the intent of obstructing any type of investigation and the matter is within the jurisdiction of a federal agency, overly technical legal distinctions should neither hinder nor prevent prosecution and punishment.”
• Conversely, there is no indication whatsoever that Congress intended to create a sweeping, all-purpose obstruction statute.
• Outside of the Government’s proposed interpretation of §1512(c), Congress has never enacted “a one-size-fits-all solution to obstruction of justice." [perhaps a general obstruction of justice statute is the meaning of (c)(2)'s text.]
• Meanwhile, many States have done just that. See J. Decker, The Varying Parameters of Obstruction of Justice in American Criminal Law, 65 La. L. Rev. 49, 77, and n. 236 (2004) (collecting statutes).
• Nothing in the enactment history of §1512(c) suggests that Congress believed that it was creating an all-encompassing statute that would obviate the need for any other obstruction prohibitions.
• Finally, it is worth remembering the statutory context in which Congress chose to prohibit the obstruction-related conduct we are considering today. The statute Congress wrote addresses this matter in a 13-word phrase, enumerated “2,” that is located within subsection (c) of a much broader §1512, which itself consists of “a reticulated list of nearly two dozen means of committing obstruction.”
• Here, it beggars belief that Congress would have inserted a breathtakingly broad, first-of-its-kind criminal obstruction statute (accompanied by a substantial 20-year maximum penalty) in the midst of a significantly more granular series of obstruction prohibitions without clarifying its intent to do so—not in the text of the provision itself, nor in the surrounding statutory context, nor in any statement issued during the enactment process.
• * * *
• And it might well be that Fischer’s conduct, as alleged here, involved the impairment (or the attempted impairment) of the availability or integrity of things used during the January 6 proceeding “in ways other than those specified in (c)(1).”
• If so, then Fischer’s prosecution under §1512(c)(2) can, and should, proceed. That issue remains available for the lower courts to determine on remand.

Barrett Dissent (Sotomayor, Kagan)

• The Court does not dispute that Congress’s joint session qualifies as an “official proceeding”; that rioters delayed the proceeding; or even that Fischer’s alleged conduct (which includes trespassing and a physical confrontation with law enforcement) was part of a successful effort to forcibly halt the certification of the election results.
• Given these premises, the case that Fischer can be tried for “obstructing, influencing, or impeding an official proceeding” seems open and shut.
• So why does the Court hold otherwise?
• Because it simply cannot believe that Congress meant what it said.
• But statutes often go further than the problem that inspired them, and under the rules of statutory interpretation, we stick to the text anyway.
• The Court, abandoning that approach, does textual backflips to find some way—any way—to narrow the reach of subsection (c)(2).
• I Textualism
• [examine dictionary entries for "obstruct", "impede", "influence", "otherwise"]
• In other words, (c)(1) targets document and object spoliation—classic means of obstruction.
• Subsection (c)(2) then prohibits obstructing, influencing, or impeding an official proceeding by means different from those specified in (c)(1), thereby serving as a catchall.
• Blocking an official proceeding from moving forward surely qualifies as obstructing or impeding the proceeding by means other than document destruction. Fischer’s alleged conduct thus falls within (c)(2)’s scope.
• II A Court's Perverse Reading
• Opting for a narrower approach, the Court declines to take (c)(2) on its own terms. Instead, it borrows the evidentiary focus of (c)(1) to hold that a defendant violates (c)(2) only by “impair[ing] the availability or integrity for use in an official proceeding of records, documents, objects, or ... other things used in the proceeding.”
• But snipping words from one subsection and grafting them onto another violates our normal interpretive principles.
• II A 1 Misapplication of Canon of Interpretation
• The noscitur [a sociis] canon counsels that “words grouped in a list should be given related meanings.” A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law §31, p. 195 (2012)
• The ejusdem canon applies when “a catchall phrase” follows “an enumeration of specifics, as in dogs, cats, horses, cattle, and other animals.” Scalia & Garner §32, at 199. We often interpret the catchall phrase to “embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words.”
• These canons are valuable tools. But applying either to (c)(2) is like using a hammer to pound in a screw—it looks like it might work, but using it botches the job.
• Unlike the pattern to which the noscitur canon applies, §1512(c) is not a list of terms that includes an ambiguous word. So the Court does not do what it does when applying noscitur: select between multiple accepted meanings of the words “obstructs,” “influences,” and “impedes.” Instead, it modifies those words by adding an adverbial phrase: obstructs, influences or impedes by “impair[ing] the availability or integrity for use in an official proceeding of records, documents, or objects.”
• Unlike the pattern to which ejusdem applies, (c)(2) is “not a general or collective term following a list of specific items to which a particular statutory command is applicable.”
• Instead, (c)(1) and (c)(2) are “distinct and independent prohibitions.”
• To my knowledge, we have never applied either of these canons to a statute resembling §1512(c). Rather than identify such a case, the Court invents examples of a sign at the zoo and a football league rule.
• ... c)(1) focuses specifically on objects in a proceeding, and (c)(2) broadens the lens to the proceeding itself.
• II A 2 Precedent
• The Court next recruits help from Begay [v. United States, 553 U. S. 137, 150–151 (2008)], which interprets an “otherwise” clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act.
• But §1512(c) is structured differently than the statute in Begay. While §1512(c) contains two distinct criminal prohibitions—(c)(1) and (c)(2)—the statutory definition in Begay contained a list of examples followed immediately by a residual clause. The latter structure more readily supports interpreting the general clause in light of the specifics, much like a statute to which the ejusdem canon would apply.
• Postscript: Seven years after Begay was decided, we held ACCA’s residual clause void for vagueness. Johnson v. United States, 576 U. S. 591, 597 (2015). So the clause is not only distinguishable, but also a poor model for statutory interpretation.
• II A 3 Legislative History
• The Court argues that “there would have been scant reason for Congress to provide any specific examples” in (c)(1) if (c)(2) covered all forms of obstructive conduct.
• If (c)(1) has any function, it must be to cast light (and impose limits) on (c)(2).
• What the Court does not say is that its rewrite also eliminates the need for (c)(1)’s examples.
• The Court’s interpretation assumes that Congress used a convoluted, two-step approach to enact a prohibition on “impair[ing] the integrity or availability of records, documents, or other objects for use in an official proceeding.” So why didn’t Congress just say that?
• ... the statute’s backstory. When the Enron scandal occurred, Congress (along with the general public) was taken aback to discover that seemingly criminal conduct was actually not a federal crime. As it then existed, §1512 had a loophole: It imposed liability on those who persuaded others to destroy documents, but not on the people who themselves destroyed documents.
• Congress enacted §1512(c) to close this “Enron gap.” Subsection (c)(1) deals with the particular problem at hand—document destruction. Subsection (c)(2) reflects Congress’s desire to avoid future surprises: It is “a catchall for matters not spe- cifically contemplated—known unknowns.” Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 556 U. S. 848, 860 (2009).
• Enron exposed more than the need to prohibit evidence spoliation—it also exposed the need to close statutory gaps.
• II A 4
• While the Court insists that (c)(1) limits (c)(2), it cannot seem to settle on the “common attribute” in the first subsection that cabins the second.
• [physical evidence limitation] On one hand, the Court says that “(c)(2) makes it a crime to impair the availability or integrity of records, documents, or objects used in an official proceeding.”
• [evidence impairment theory] On the other hand, the Court says that (c)(2) prohibits “impairing the availability or integrity of other things used in an official proceeding,” such as “witness testimony” or “intangible information.”
• Both formulations are problematic—and not only because both are atextual.
• The first [physical evidence limitation], focused solely on physical items, would leave (c)(2) with almost no work to do.
• The somewhat amorphous “other things” limitation has the benefit of giving (c)(2) a wider berth, but it is unclear how the Court landed on it. The term does not appear in (c)(1) or in §1512’s surrounding subsections, which refer specifically to records, documents, objects, and testimony
• Indeed, “[h]ad Congress intended to limit [§1512(c)(2)]’s reach” as the Court asserts, it “easily could have written” the catchall to say “otherwise impair the integrity or availability of records, documents, objects, or other things for use in an official proceeding.”
• It did not, and we should not pretend that it did.
• II B Relationship to other sections of §1512
• As the Court sees it, interpreting (c)(2) according to its plain text would render other obstruction provisions, within §1512 and throughout Chapter 73, superfluous.
• The Court exaggerates. Subsection (c)(2) applies only to conduct that obstructs an “official proceeding.”
• Under the “nexus” requirement, the defendant’s conduct must have a “relationship in time, causation, or logic” with the proceeding.
• And the defendant must act in “contemplation” of a “particular official proceeding.”
• The circuits have unanimously applied this requirement to §1512(c).
• This element [nexus requirement] eliminates much of the overlap that the Court perceives between (c)(2) and the provisions that do not require an “official proceeding.”
• This is not to deny that (c)(2)—if allowed its broad, ordinary meaning—overlaps with several offenses in Chapter 73. Even so, (c)(2) still leaves a healthy amount of work for other obstruction offenses.
• As it stands, the canon against surplusage does not provide any reason to artificially narrow (c)(2)’s scope. In any event, the Court’s formulation does not begin to cure the statutory overlap. [examples follow]
• In fact, the broader statutory context works against the Court’s interpretation. Congress did not select the verbs “obstruct,” “influence,” and “impede” at random. Those words were already in §1503, which prohibits “corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, influenc[ing], obstruct[ing], or imped[ing] ... the due administration of justice.” We have described this “ ‘Omnibus Clause’ ” as a “catchall,” because it follows several specific proscriptions against coercive behavior toward jurors and court officers.
• Courts have routinely declined to “rea[d] the omnibus clause” as limited to “acts similar in manner to those prescribed by the statute’s specific language.” United States v. Howard, 569 F. 2d 1331, 1333, 1335 (CA5 1978) (collecting cases).
• And Justice Scalia agreed that ejusdem generis did not apply to limit the Omnibus Clause, “one of the several distinct and independent prohibitions contained in §1503 that share only the word ‘Whoever,’ which begins the statute, and the penalty provision which ends it.”
• Section 1512(c) follows the very same pattern.
• II C Breadth and Consequences
• The Court concludes with an appeal to consequences: Construing (c)(2) broadly would “expos[e] activists and lobbyists alike to decades in prison.” This fear is overstated.
• To begin with, the Court ignores that (c)(2) requires proof that a defendant acted “corruptly.”
• The meaning of this term is unsettled, but all of its possible definitions limit the scope of liability. On one proposed interpretation, a defendant acts corruptly by “ ‘us[ing] unlawful means, or act[ing] with an unlawful purpose, or both.’ ” On another, a defendant acts “corruptly” if he “act[s] ‘with an intent to procure an unlawful benefit either for himself or for some other person.’
• Under either, the “corruptly” element should screen out innocent activists and lobbyists who engage in lawful activity. And if not, those defendants can bring as-applied First Amendment challenges.
• The Court also emphasizes (c)(2)’s 20-year maximum penalty.
• “Congress presumably enacts laws with high maximums and no minimums when it thinks the prohibited conduct may run the gamut from major to minor.”
• Indeed, given the breadth of its terms, (c)(2) naturally encompasses actions that range in severity.
• * * *
• There is no getting around it: Section 1512(c)(2) is an expansive statute. Yet Congress, not this Court, weighs the “pros and cons of whether a statute should sweep broadly or narrowly.” United States v. Rodgers, 466 U. S. 475, 484 (1984). Once Congress has set the outer bounds of liability, the Executive Branch has the discretion to select particular cases to prosecute within those boundaries.
• By atextually narrowing §1512(c)(2), the Court has failed to respect the prerogatives of the political branches.

Full Recounting of Facts

• A list of the material facts is available above

Majority Full Argument

• See Material Facts
• See Procedural History
• The core of the rationale is available above