Notable Items:
Appellant: Joseph L. Kanaley
Appellee: Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Co., Inc.
Venue: United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.
Issue(s) Before the Court:
Plaintiff / Appellant / Petitioner's Claim(s):
Defendant / Appellee / Respondent's Claim(s):
Holding(s) and Disposition:
Held:
Disposition:
Material Facts:
- On April 6, 1957, plaintiff, with two friends, was walking along a public highway in the City of Fulton, New York.
- A freight train, operated by defendant, was slowly crossing the street.
- One of plaintiff's friends jumped on one of the cars;
- plaintiff jumped on a ladder on the car directly behind.
- As the car passed the freight house, plaintiff came into contact with the building causing him to jump to a ledge on the side of the building.
- Still holding the basketball, he attempted to leap again onto the car but fell to the tracks where the wheels ran over his right arm necessitating amputation.
Procedural History:
- Plaintiff appeals from a judgment dismissing the complaint at the close of plaintiff's case for failure to prove negligence and failure to prove plaintiff free from contributory negligence.
- The action originally commenced in the Supreme Court for Oswego County (New York) was removed to the federal court (28 U.S.C.A. 1332, 1441).
Rationale
Majority Opinion
- 5. ... But a single determination is possible from the facts and that is that the boy exercised no care at all for his own safety, and under those circumstances, as a matter of law, the plaintiffs failed to sustain the burden resting upon them to show that he was free from negligence contributing to his injuries,' citing Wendell v. N.Y.C. & H.R.R. Co., 1883, 91 N.Y. 420, and Camarado v. New York State Railways, 1928, 247 N.Y. 111, 159 N.E. 879.
- 6. The judgment is affirmed.
- A full description of the rationale is available below
Majority Full Argument
- 1. Procedural History
- 2. Facts of the case
- 3. Under the law of New York (applicable here) plaintiff was a trespasser to whom defendant would be liable only for wanton and reckless conduct or as sometimes phrased, an affirmative act of negligence.
- 4. "Toward mere trespassers or bare licensees the rule is well settled that the only duty owing to them by the owner or occupier of land is to abstain from inflicting intentional, wanton or willful injuries unless he maintains some hidden engine of destruction" (Carbone v. Mackchil Realty Corp.)
- 5. ... But a single determination is possible from the facts and that is that the boy exercised no care at all for his own safety, and under those circumstances, as a matter of law, the plaintiffs failed to sustain the burden resting upon them to show that he was free from negligence contributing to his injuries,' citing Wendell v. N.Y.C. & H.R.R. Co., 1883, 91 N.Y. 420, and Camarado v. New York State Railways, 1928, 247 N.Y. 111, 159 N.E. 879.
- 6. The judgment is affirmed.
- The core of the rationale is available above