Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah

Notable Items:

Compare United States v. O'Brien: These cases [Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233 (1936), and Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960)] stand not for the proposition that legislative motive is a proper basis for declaring a statute unconstitutional, but that the inevitable effect of a statute on its face may render it unconstitutional.

Petitioner:
Respondent:
Venue: Supreme Court of the United States
Opinion of the Court: Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah (1993)

Issue(s) Before the Court:

Are four specific ordinances (87-40, 87-52, 87-71, and 87-72) enacted by the city council of Hialeah Florida in accord with the Free Exercise Clause?

Petitioner's Claim(s):

... alleging violations of their rights under, inter alia, the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
... the complaint sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive and monetary relief.

Respondent's Claim(s):

... compelling governmental interests in preventing public health risks and cruelty to animals fully justified the absolute prohibition on ritual sacrifice accomplished by the ordinances, and that an exception to that prohibition for religious conduct would unduly interfere with fulfillment of the governmental interest because any more narrow restrictions would be unenforceable as a result of the Santeria religion's secret nature.

Holding(s) and Disposition:

Held: No.
Disposition: The judgment is reversed. 936 F.2d 586, reversed.

Material Facts:

In April 1987, the Church leased land in the city of Hialeah, Florida, and announced plans to establish a house of worship as well as a school, cultural center, and museum.
The resolutions and ordinances passed at that and later meetings are set forth in the Appendix following this opinion.
Following enactment of these ordinances, the Church and Pichardo filed this action pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.
A full recounting of the facts is available below

Procedural History:

Following enactment of these ordinances, the Church and Pichardo filed this action pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.
The District Court granted summary judgment to the individual defendants, finding that they had absolute immunity for their legislative acts and that the ordinances and resolutions adopted by the council did not constitute an official policy of harassment, as alleged by petitioners.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in a one-paragraph per curiam opinion.

Rationale

Majority Opinion (Kennedy, Rehnquist, White, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Souter, Thomas)

The record in this case compels the conclusion that suppression of the central element of the Santeria worship service was the object of the ordinances.
That the ordinances were enacted "'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,'" their suppression of Santeria religious practice, id., at 279, is revealed by the events preceding their enactment.
It is established in our strict scrutiny jurisprudence that "a law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest 'of the highest order' ... when it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest unprohibited."
The ordinances "ha[ve] every appearance of a prohibition that society is prepared to impose upon [Santeria worshippers] but not upon itself."
This precise evil is what the requirement of general applicability is designed to prevent.
Legislators may not devise mechanisms, overt or disguised, designed to persecute or oppress a religion or its practices.
The laws here in question were enacted contrary to these constitutional principles, and they are void.
Reversed.
A full description of the rationale is available below

Scalia concur in part, concur in judgement (Rehnquist)

The Court analyzes the "neutrality" and the "general applicability" of the Hialeah ordinances in separate sections (Parts II-A and II-B, respectively), ....
... would frankly acknowledge that the terms are not only "interrelated," ante, at 531, but substantially overlap.
In my view, the defect of lack of neutrality applies primarily to those laws that by their terms impose disabilities on the basis of religion (e. g., a law excluding members of a certain sect from public benefits ....
whereas the defect of lack of general applicability applies primarily to those laws which, though neutral in their terms, through their design, construction, or enforcement target the practices of a particular religion for discriminatory treatment, ....
... section 2 of Part II-A. I do not join that section because it departs from the opinion's general focus on the object of the laws at issue to consider the subjective motivation of the lawmakers ....
As I have noted elsewhere, it is virtually impossible to determine the singular "motive" of a collective legislative body, see, e. g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U. S. 578, [bye bye intent Originalism]

Souter concur in part, concur in judgement

I do not join Part II, where the dicta appear, for I have doubts about whether the Smith rule merits adherence.
According to Smith, if prohibiting the exercise of religion results from enforcing a "neutral, generally applicable" law, the Free Exercise Clause has not been offended.
... noncontroversial principle, also expressed in Smith though established long before, that the Free Exercise Clause is offended when prohibiting religious exercise results from a law that is not neutral or generally applicable.
... facial neutrality would permit discovery of a law's object or purpose only by analysis of the law's words, structure, and operation, ....
... formal [neutrality] ... secures only protection against deliberate discrimination.... laws whose "object" is to prohibit religious exercise ....
... substantive neutrality, which, in addition to demanding a secular object, would generally require government to accommodate religious differences by exempting religious practices from formally neutral laws. ... laws that prohibit religious exercise as an "incidental effect," ....
... the latter, laws that satisfy formal neutrality, Smith would subject to no free-exercise scrutiny at all, even when they prohibit religious exercise in application.
The proposition for which the Smith rule stands, then, is that formal neutrality, along with general applicability, are sufficient conditions for constitutionality under the Free Exercise Clause.
[Section II]
[Section III]

Blackmun concurrance

The result in the case before the Court today, ... , does not necessarily reflect this Court's views of the strength of a State's interest in prohibiting cruelty to animals.
The number of organizations that have filed amicus briefs on behalf of this interest, however, demonstrates that it is not a concern to be treated lightly.

Full Recounting of Facts

Petitioner Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. (Church), is a not-for-profit corporation organized under Florida law in 1973.
In April 1987, the Church leased land in the city of Hialeah, Florida, and announced plans to establish a house of worship as well as a school, cultural center, and museum.
... the announcement of the plans to open a Santeria church in Hialeah prompted the city council to hold an emergency public session on June 9, 1987.
The resolutions and ordinances passed at that and later meetings are set forth in the Appendix following this opinion.
Following enactment of these ordinances, the Church and Pichardo filed this action pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.
The District Court granted summary judgment to the individual defendants, finding that they had absolute immunity for their legislative acts and that the ordinances and resolutions adopted by the council did not constitute an official policy of harassment, as alleged by petitioners.
A list of the material facts is available above

Majority Full Argument

Our review confirms that the laws in question were enacted by officials who did not understand, failed to perceive, or chose to ignore the fact that their official actions violated the Nation's essential commitment to religious freedom.
The challenged laws had an impermissible object; and ... the secular ends asserted in defense of the laws were pursued only with respect to conduct motivated by religious beliefs.
[Section I A: Background on Santeria]
The ... Santeria religion ... one of the principal forms of devotion is an animal sacrifice.
[Section I B: Facts of the Case and Procedural History (above)]
... the District Court concluded that the purpose of the ordinances was not to exclude the Church from the city but to end the practice of animal sacrifice, ....
... it noted that in any event "specifically regulating [religious] conduct" does not violate the First Amendment "when [the conduct] is deemed inconsistent with public health and welfare."
The court found four compelling interests.
1. found that animal sacrifices present a substantial health risk, both to participants and the general public.
2. found emotional injury to children who witness the sacrifice of animals.
3. determined that the method of killing used in Santeria sacrifice was "unreliable and not humane, and that the animals, before being sacrificed, are often kept in conditions that produce a great deal of fear and stress in the animal."
4. found compelling the city's interest in restricting the slaughter or sacrifice of animals to areas zoned for slaughterhouse
[Section II] (Souter NOT joining)
The city does not argue that Santeria is not a "religion" within the meaning of the First Amendment.
... a law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice.
[Section II A: Neutrality Requirement] (White NOT joining)
In our Establishment Clause cases we have often stated the principle that the First Amendment forbids an official purpose to disapprove of a particular religion or of religion in general.
At a minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue discriminates against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U. S. 599, 607 (1961)
[Section II A 1: Neutrality Requirement]
... if the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation, the law is not neutral, ...
... and it is invalid unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to advance that interest.
Official action that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment cannot be shielded by mere compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality.
The record in this case compels the conclusion that suppression of the central element of the Santeria worship service was the object of the ordinances.
[analysis of text of the ordinances demonstrating that they target Santeria specifically.]
For our purposes here, however, the four substantive ordinances may be treated as a group for neutrality purposes.
[Section II A 2: Neutrality Requirement (cont.)] (Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas NOT joining)
... "[n]eutrality in its application requires an equal protection mode of analysis."
That the ordinances were enacted "'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,'" their suppression of Santeria religious practice, id., at 279, is revealed by the events preceding their enactment.
[Section II A 3: Neutrality Requirement Conclusion]
In sum, the neutrality inquiry leads to one conclusion: The ordinances had as their object the suppression of religion.
... the texts of the ordinances were gerrymandered with care to proscribe religious killings of animals but to exclude almost all secular killings; ...
... the ordinances suppress much more religious conduct than is necessary in order to achieve the legitimate ends asserted in their defense.
[Section II B: General Applicability Requirement]
All laws are selective to some extent, but categories of selection are of paramount concern when a law has the incidental effect of burdening religious practice.
The ordinances are [substantially] underinclusive for those ends. (...protecting the public health, preventing cruelty to animals. ...the health risk posed by consumption of uninspected meat.)
The ordinances "ha[ve] every appearance of a prohibition that society is prepared to impose upon [Santeria worshippers] but not upon itself."
This precise evil is what the requirement of general applicability is designed to prevent.
[Section III: Strict Scrutiny]
A law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not of general application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny.
The compelling interest standard that we apply once a law fails to meet the Smith requirements ...
It follows from what we have already said that these ordinances cannot withstand this scrutiny.
It is established in our strict scrutiny jurisprudence that "a law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest 'of the highest order' ... when it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest unprohibited."
[Section IV: Rule of Law]
Legislators may not devise mechanisms, overt or disguised, designed to persecute or oppress a religion or its practices.
The laws here in question were enacted contrary to these constitutional principles, and they are void.
Reversed.
The core of the rationale is available above