Dworkin: A "good" originalist will focus on the abstract principles embedded in the constitutional text, and this in turn will require an originalist interpreter to make substantive moral judgments and not simply empirical historical judgements.
Whittington: The remainder of this paper is concerned with demonstrating the flaws in this position.
Regarding Semantic Intention: "Moreover, Dworkin ignores the possibility that the Founders were being concrete when employing broad but not necessarily abstract language." [apply to "cruel and unusual". which punishments?] Quite possibly, however, they meant to express a quite specific principle through the cruel and unusual clause. [what is the specific principle?]
[Appears that Whittington asserts that Dworking says] In employing abstract language the Founders meant to convey an abstract, and ultimately empty, concept.
The Possibility of a Moral Referent: Whittington assigns descriptive vs casual models to Dworkin, but Dworkin does not
Reading by the "Best Light":
In this reading, the Founders did not specify between abstract and concrete intentions. Instead, the Founders possessed both and both kinds of intentions are embedded in the text.
Dworkin's effort to hold the Founders to both kinds of intentions is unsuccessful, and the tools for laying that failure bare have already been provided in the second section above. Dworkin's analytical claim that the Framers held both kinds of intentions rests on obscuring the distinctions between motivations, expectations, and intentions.

2023-09-27: Whittington Dworkin's "Originalism": The Role of Intentions in Constitutional Interpretation (PDF) 2000

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