Notable Items:
- Standing issue: "... the relief sought is wholly prospective, to preclude further prosecution under a statute alleged to violate appellees' constitutional rights." See Part 3 of Majority Full Argument below
- Equitable relief in cases of unconstitutional state criminal statutes.
Petitioner:
Respondent: George and Maxine Maynard
Venue: Supreme Court of the United States
Opinion of the Court: Wooley v. Maynard (1977)
Issue(s) Before the Court:
... whether the State of New Hampshire may constitutionally enforce criminal sanctions against persons who cover the motto "Live Free or Die" on passenger vehicle license plates because that motto is repugnant to their moral and religious beliefs.
Petitioner's Claim(s):
... that the District Court was precluded from exercising jurisdiction in this case by the principles of equitable restraint enunciated in Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971)
Respondent's Claim(s):
... believes to be constitutionally protected activity [obscuring 'Live Free or Die' on a license plate affixed to their automobile] in order to avoid becoming enmeshed in [another] criminal proceeding. ,br>
"I refuse to be coerced by the State into advertising a slogan which I find morally, ethically, religiously and politically abhorrent."
Holding(s) and Disposition:
Held: The State's claimed interests in requiring display of the state motto on license plates (1) so as to facilitate the identification of passenger vehicles, and (2) so as to promote appreciation of history, individualism, and state pride, are not sufficiently compelling to justify infringement of appellees' First Amendment rights. The purpose of the first interest could be achieved by less drastic means, and the second interest cannot outweigh an individual's First Amendment right to avoid becoming the courier for the State's ideological message.
Disposition: 406 F. Supp. 1381, affirmed.
Material Facts:
- Since 1969, New Hampshire has required that noncommercial vehicles bear license plates embossed with the state motto, "Live Free or Die."
- Another New Hampshire statute makes it a misdemeanor "knowingly [to obscure] . . . the figures or letters on any number plate."
- Pursuant to these beliefs, the Maynards began early in 1974 to cover up the motto on their license plates.
- On November 27, 1974, Mr. Maynard was issued a citation for violating § 262:27-c. On December 6, 1974, he appeared pro se in Lebanon, N.H., District Court to answer the charge.
- On December 28, 1974, Mr. Maynard was again charged....
- Prior to trial on the second offense, Mr. Maynard was charged with yet a third violation of § 262:27-c on January 3, 1975.
- A full recounting of the facts is available below
Procedural History:
- On March 4, 1975, appellees brought the present action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire. They sought injunctive and declaratory relief against enforcement of N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§ 262:27-c, 263:1, insofar as these required displaying the state motto on their vehicle license plates, and made it a criminal offense to obscure the motto.
- On March 11, 1975, the single District Judge issued a temporary restraining order against further arrests and prosecutions of the Maynards.
- Because the appellees sought an injunction against a state statute on grounds of its unconstitutionality, a three-judge District Court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281.
- Following a hearing on the merits, [Footnote 6] the District Court entered an order enjoining the State "from arresting and prosecuting [the Maynards] at any time in the future for covering over that portion of their license plates that contains the motto 'Live Free or Die.'
Rationale
Burger Majority Opinion (Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, Powell, Stevens)
- We are thus faced with the question of whether the State may constitutionally require an individual to participate in the dissemination of an ideological message by displaying it on his private property in a manner and for the express purpose that it be observed and read by the public. We hold that the State may not do so.
- We begin with the proposition that the right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all. See Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 319 U. S. 633-634 (1943)
- Here, as in Barnette, we are faced with a state measure which forces an individual, as part of his daily life -- indeed, constantly while his automobile is in public view -- to be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he finds unacceptable.
- We must also determine whether the State's countervailing interest is sufficiently compelling to justify requiring appellees to display the state motto on their license plates. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 391 U. S. 376-377 (1968).
- The two interests advanced by the State are that display of the motto (1) facilitates the identification of passenger vehicles, and (2) promotes appreciation of history, individualism, and state pride.
- Even were we to credit the State's reasons, and "even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose." Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 364 U. S. 488 (1960) [emphasis added. not "narrowly tailored".]
- However, where the State's interest is to disseminate an ideology, no matter how acceptable to some, such interest cannot outweigh an individual's First Amendment right to avoid becoming the courier for such message.
- We conclude that the State of New Hampshire my not require appellees to display the state motto [Footnote 15] upon their vehicle license plates; and, accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the District Court.
- A full description of the rationale is available below
White Concurrance in part, dissent in part (Blackmun, Rehnquist)
- "The general rule is that equity will not interfere to prevent the enforcement of a criminal statute even though unconstitutional.... To justify such interference, there must be exceptional circumstances and a clear showing that an injunction is necessary in order to afford adequate protection of constitution.al rights." Spielman Motor Co. v. Dodge, 295 U. S. 89, 295 U. S. 95 (1935).
- The Court has plainly departed from the teaching of these cases.
- Here, the State's enforcement of its statute prior to the declaration of unconstitutionality by the federal court would appear to be no more than the performance of their duty by the State's law enforcement officers.
Rehnquist Dissent (Blackmun)
- The State has not forced appellees to "say" anything, and it has not forced them to communicate ideas with nonverbal actions reasonably likened to "speech," such as wearing a lapel button promoting a political candidate or waving a flag as a symbolic gesture.
- The State has simply required that all noncommercial automobiles bear license tags with the state motto, "Live Free or Die."
- Appellees have not been forced to affirm or reject that motto; they are simply required by the State, under its police power, to carry a state auto license tag for identification and registration purposes.
- What the Court does not demonstrate is that there is any "speech" or "speaking" in the context of this case.
- The issue, unconfronted by the Court, is whether appellees, in displaying, as they are required to do, state license tags, the format of which is known to all as having been prescribed by the State, would be considered to be advocating political or ideological views.
- For First Amendment principles to be implicated, the State must place the citizen in the position of either apparently or actually "asserting as true" the message. This was the focus of Barnette, and clearly distinguishes this case from that one.
- Thus appellees could place on their bumper a conspicuous bumper sticker explaining in no uncertain terms that they do not profess the motto "Live Free or Die," and that they violently disagree with the connotations of that motto.
Full Recounting of Facts
- Since 1969, New Hampshire has required that noncommercial vehicles bear license plates embossed with the state motto, "Live Free or Die."
- Another New Hampshire statute makes it a misdemeanor "knowingly [to obscure] . . . the figures or letters on any number plate."
- The Maynards consider the New Hampshire State motto to be repugnant to their moral, religious, and political beliefs,and therefore assert it objectionable to disseminate this message by displaying it on their automobiles.
- Pursuant to these beliefs, the Maynards began early in 1974 to cover up the motto on their license plates.
- On November 27, 1974, Mr. Maynard was issued a citation for violating § 262:27-c. On December 6, 1974, he appeared pro se in Lebanon, N.H., District Court to answer the charge.
- On December 28, 1974, Mr. Maynard was again charged....
- Maynard informed the court that, as a matter of conscience, he refused to pay the two fines. The court thereupon sentenced him to jail for a period of 15 days. He has served the full sentence.
- Prior to trial on the second offense, Mr. Maynard was charged with yet a third violation of § 262:27-c on January 3, 1975.
- On March 4, 1975, appellees brought the present action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire. They sought injunctive and declaratory relief against enforcement of N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§ 262:27-c, 263:1, insofar as these required displaying the state motto on their vehicle license plates, and made it a criminal offense to obscure the motto.
- A list of the material facts is available above
Burger Majority Full Argument (Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, Powell, Stevens)
- Part 1: See Material Facts
- Part 2: See Procedural History
- Part 3: [ Analysis of standing to bring a federal action based upon Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971), Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452 (1974); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U. S. 922, 422 U. S. 930-931 (1975), and Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U. S. 592, 420 U. S. 609-610, n. 21 (1975) ]
- Here, however, the suit is in no way "designed to annul the results of a state trial," since the relief sought is wholly prospective, to preclude further prosecution under a statute alleged to violate appellees' constitutional rights.
- The Maynards seek only to be free from prosecutions for future violations of the same statutes. Younger does not bar federal jurisdiction.
- In their complaint, the Maynards sought both declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of the New Hampshire statutes.
- It is correct that, generally, a court will not enjoin. "the enforcement of a criminal statute even though unconstitutional," Spielman Motor Co. v. Dodge, 295 U. S. 89, 295 U. S. 95 (1935) ....
- But this is not an absolute policy, and, in some circumstances, injunctive relief may be appropriate.
- The threat of repeated prosecutions in the future against both him and his wife, and the effect of such a continuing threat on their ability to perform the ordinary tasks of daily life which require an automobile, is sufficient to justify injunctive relief. Cf. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U. S. 157 (1943).
- Part 4 [Statement of Issue before the Court]
- The District Court held that, by covering up the state motto "Live Free or Die" on his automobile license plate, Mr. Maynard was engaging in symbolic speech ....
- We find it unnecessary to pass on the "symbolic speech" issue, since we find more appropriate First Amendment grounds to affirm the judgment of the District Court.
- We are thus faced with the question of whether the State may constitutionally require an individual to participate in the dissemination of an ideological message by displaying it on his private property in a manner and for the express purpose that it be observed and read by the public. We hold that the State may not do so.
- Part 4 A [First Amendment right(s) implicated]
- We begin with the proposition that the right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all. See Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 319 U. S. 633-634 (1943)
- Here, as in Barnette, we are faced with a state measure which forces an individual, as part of his daily life -- indeed, constantly while his automobile is in public view -- to be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he finds unacceptable.
- Part 4 B
- We must also determine whether the State's countervailing interest is sufficiently compelling to justify requiring appellees to display the state motto on their license plates. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 391 U. S. 376-377 (1968).
- The two interests advanced by the State are that display of the motto (1) facilitates the identification of passenger vehicles, and (2) promotes appreciation of history, individualism, and state pride.
- Even were we to credit the State's reasons, and "even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose." Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 364 U. S. 488 (1960)
- However, where the State's interest is to disseminate an ideology, no matter how acceptable to some, such interest cannot outweigh an individual's First Amendment right to avoid becoming the courier for such message.
- We conclude that the State of New Hampshire my not require appellees to display the state motto [Footnote 15] upon their vehicle license plates; and, accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the District Court.
- The core of the rationale is available above